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BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION 
Abraham Bell∗ and Gideon Parchomovsky** 
ABSTRACT 
Efficiency and fairness require paying full compensation 
to property owners when their property is taken by eminent 
domain.  Yet, current law requires condemnees to settle for 
fair market value.  Courts and commentators acknowledge 
the inadequacy of this state of affairs, but defend it on 
practical grounds — there is no way to measure the full 
subjective value of property to its owner.  Subjective value is 
neither observable nor verifiable; consequently, courts 
cannot rely upon owners’ reports of the value they attach to 
their properties, and must rely instead, upon a suboptimal 
compensation regime.  To date, the challenge of screening 
truthful from exaggerated evaluation has proved 
insurmountable. 
This Article proposes a strikingly simple solution to the 
undercompensation conundrum.  It offers a novel self-
assessment mechanism that can make full compensation at 
subjective value practical by inducing potential condemnees 
to report accurately.  Under our proposal, property owners 
must be given the opportunity to state the value of the 
property designated for condemnation.  Once property 
owners name their price, the government can take the 
 
∗ Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Lecturer, Bar Ilan 
University, Faculty of Law. 
** Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan 
University, Faculty of Law.  This Article greatly benefited from comments and 
criticisms by Ian Ayres, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shachar, Richard Epstein, Gerry 
Faulhaber, Bill Fischel, Leo Katz, Michael Knoll, Wendell Pritchett, Ed Rock, Peter 
Siegelman, Alex Stein, Bill Treanor and Polk Wagner, and from excellent research 
assistance provided by Geoffrey Bauer. 
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property only at that price.  However, if the government 
chooses not to take and pay, the property will become subject 
to two restrictions.  First, for seventy years, the property 
cannot be sold for less than the self-assessed price.  If the 
property is transferred for less than that price, the owner will 
have to pay the shortfall to the government.  Second, the self-
assessed price – discounted to take account of the 
peculiarities of property tax assessments – will become the 
benchmark for the owner’s property tax liability.  These dual 
burdens of partial inalienability and enhanced tax liability 
will induce honest reporting by owners, while reducing the 
transaction costs created by the compensation process.  The 
Article sketches several refinements of and limitations on this 
mechanism in order to improve its accuracy and prevent both 
the government and property owners from abusing it. 
We demonstrate that, properly used, our self-assessment 
mechanism can dramatically enhance the efficiency and 
fairness of eminent domain proceedings, and may even be 
extended to regulatory takings. 
 JEL classifications: H29, K10, K11, K41 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eminent domain is a controversial prerogative.  The 
government’s power to take property upon payment of “just 
compensation” undermines property rights that are considered 
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inviolable in other contexts.  As a consequence, an increasingly large 
number of legal controversies and voluminous scholarly literature 
concern such questions as how much “public use” is necessary to 
justify a taking,1 and when government actions bearing the label 
“regulation” are, in fact, regulatory takings for which compensation 
must be paid.2 
Surprisingly, much less attention has been paid lately to the 
equally important issues of the amount of compensation that should 
be paid to condemnees and whether current doctrine actually 
guarantees “just” compensation.3  Theorists and practitioners have 
long recognized two flaws in the compensation mechanism under 
current law.  First, although the constitutional requirement of “just 
compensation” theoretically requires the payment of compensation for 
the full value of property to the owner,4 in practice, current law 
requires payment of compensation at the market value of the property 
taken, rather than the true reserve price of the aggrieved owner.5 
Thus, takings law provides inadequate compensation to owners whose 
reserve value exceeds market price.  Second, current compensation 
practices give rise to high litigation and other transaction costs. 
Undercompensation is ubiquitous.  Indeed, many important 
compensation doctrines require courts specifically to ignore many 
kinds of value lost to owners of taken property, such as consequential 
damages6 and goodwill.7  Courts have adopted restrictive rules such 
 
1 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 61 (1986); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, Symposium: 
The Death of Poletown: the Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development 
After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866 (2004); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent 
Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957. 
2 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); 
Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation,13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29 (2003) 
3 Cf. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (identifying valuation 
mechanisms for just compensation). 
4 For discussion, see Part I.C., infra. 
5 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("[L]oss to 
the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or 
idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is 
properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship."); United States v. 
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (explaining that, for practical reasons, "courts 
early adopted, and have retained, the concept of fair market value" in determining 
takings compensation); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (stating 
that just compensation "does not exceed market value fairly determined"). 
6 See infra Part I.C.1. 
7 See infra Part I.C.1.  
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as the fair market value standard “[b]ecause of serious practical 
difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular 
property at a given time.”8  Subjective value is neither observable nor 
readily ascertainable.  If the constitutional standard for “just 
compensation” required payment at full subjective value, property 
owners would no doubt exaggerate their self-estimations of the value 
they place on property and courts would have no reasonable means 
for reviewing the accuracy of these reports.9 
The problem of inadequate compensation has not gone unnoticed 
by courts.  Judge Posner wrote in Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates10: 
Compensation in the constitutional sense is [] not full 
compensation, for market value is not the value that every 
owner of property attaches to his property but merely the 
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.  Many 
owners are “intramarginal” meaning that because of 
relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special 
suitability of the property for those particular (perhaps 
idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than 
its market value…. 
The inefficiency of the current compensation regime is 
exacerbated by the high litigation and other transaction costs to which 
it gives rise.  Even with the concession to fair market value as the 
measuring stick, the current compensation mechanism generates high 
costs, and considerable efficiency losses.11  Indeed, recognition of this 
fact has led some scholars to propose that compensation not be paid 
for certain small takings,12 and other to doubt the wisdom of eminent 
domain power altogether.13  Observers have pointed to multiple cases 
in which the strategic use of such costs may permit the government 
taker to “low-ball” compensation offers.14 According to media 
reports, property owners who take the government to court routinely 
receive much higher compensation awards—often by hundreds of 
 
8 United States v. 564.43 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979). 
9 See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2005) 
(noting the problem of false valuation statements). 
10 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
11 See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 473 (1976), Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution 
in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999) 
12 See Heller & Krier, supra note 11. 
13 See Munch, supra note 11. 
14 See, e.g., Dan Browning, MnDOT’s Tactics Squeeze Landowners, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/4109734.html. 
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percent—than their peers who elected to settle for the government’s 
initial offer. Yet, the higher compensation can only be secured after 
expensive legal battles. 
Importantly, it is difficult to devise a compensation mechanism 
that would address both problems simultaneously.  The more we 
invest in determining the condemnee’s subjective value, the costlier 
the compensation process.  Conversely, compromising the accuracy 
of the compensation mechanism by eschewing payment for such 
items as goodwill lowers the cost of the process but only at the price 
of greater undercompensation of subjective value.15 
Undercompensation raises both fairness and efficiency concerns.  
First, it deprives property owners of part of the value of the property 
taken.  Because the fairness rationale for takings’ compensation posits 
that it is wrong to force an individual to bear the costs of benefiting 
society, an award that falls short of full compensation potentially 
wrongs the condemnee.16  Second, undercompensation poses the risk 
of excessive takings.  Government decisionmakers are often thought 
to be subject to fiscal illusion, meaning that they operate under the 
misapprehension that actions that impose no cost on the government 
budget are, in fact, costless.17  Under this theory, when it takes 
without compensating the owner for the full loss occasioned by the 
taking, the government takes too much.18 
In this Article, we introduce a strikingly simple bargaining 
mechanism that can dramatically reduce the scope of both problems 
and importantly does it at a very small cost.  At the core of our model 
lies a self-assessment apparatus that is designed to induce potential 
condemnees to report accurately the subjective value they place on 
the property to be taken.  Once the property owners name their price, 
the government can take the property only at that price.  However, if 
the government chooses not to take and pay, the property will become 
subject to two restrictions.  First, for seventy years, the property 
cannot be sold for less than the self-assessed price.  If the property is 
transferred for less than that price, the owner will have to pay the 
shortfall to the government.19  Second, the self-assessed price will 
become the benchmark for the owner’s property tax liability.  As we 
 
15 By contrast to market value, special subjective value is presumed to be zero 
absent evidence indicating otherwise.  
16 See infra Part I.A.  
17 See infra Part I.B. 
18 See infra Part I.B.. 
19 We thank William Fischel for helping us think through this element of our 
proposed mechanism.  Any flaws in the mechanism, of course, are solely our 
responsibility. 
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will show, the dual burdens of partial inalienability and enhanced tax 
liability should suffice to keep the owner honest in reporting her 
subjective value. 
The self-assessment mechanism provides more accurate 
compensation for subjective value, while dramatically reducing 
transaction costs created by the compensatory process.  Since owners 
name their price, they will state a value that is no less than their 
subjective value, as there is no reason for them to voluntarily part 
with their property for less than the full subjective value.  However, 
owners will not state a price greater than the subjective value, lest 
they subject themselves to excessive tax liability and limitations on 
alienation.20  Moreover, the mechanism is self-policing and therefore 
should reduce the costs of assessing and litigating property valuations.  
By relieving both sides of the need to hire expert assessors and legal 
counsel and to engage in extensive evidence-collection, our proposal 
significantly lowers the transaction costs associated with 
compensation. 
A potential peril arising under our model is that it may induce the 
government to exercise its eminent domain power excessively simply 
to boost its tax revenues.  To alleviate this concern, we complement 
the basic model with a “decoupling” mechanism that severs the 
amount paid by the owner for high self-assessed valuations from the 
amount collected by the government.  While the owner will pay based 
upon her self-assessment, the decoupling mechanism will prevent the 
government from collecting the higher tax.  Instead, taxes on the 
increment between the value of the property based on tax assessment 
rolls and the self-assessed value will be payable to recognized 
charities of the owner’s choice. 
For example, imagine that the city of Chicago declares its desire 
to use its power of eminent domain to seize realty owned by Joni Olin 
for the purpose of building a public university.  The realty – a plot 
known as Blackacre – currently has an assessed value of $200,000 on 
the city property tax rolls, and a market value of $300,000.21  
 
20 As we discuss at length in Part II, infra, we do not propose a first-best 
mechanism, and cannot precisely calibrate incentives so as to ensure that all self-
assessed values will be identical to subjective value.  However, for reasons that we 
explain infra, our mechanism should push owners toward a self-assessment of 
subjective value. 
21 Perhaps the most famous example of the unmooring of assessed value from 
market value in property tax assessment may be found in California’s Proposition 
13 passed in 1978. In addition to freezing assessed property values to 1975 levels, 
Proposition 13 capped property tax rates at one percent of assessed value, and 
limited reassessment rates to two percent per year. See PROPERTY TAXATION AND 
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However, Ms. Olin values Blackacre at $400,000, and she so declares 
its value for the purposes of the taking.  If the city of Chicago 
abandons its plan to seize Blackacre, Ms. Olin’s freedoms with 
respect to the property will be restricted in two significant ways.  
First, she will not be able to sell Blackacre for less than $400,000 
unless she pays the City of Chicago the difference between this 
amount and the eventual sale price.  Hence, if she sells Blackacre at 
less than $400,000, she will have to make up any shortfall by making 
a payment to the city of Chicago.  For instance, if she sells Blackacre 
to Frieda Ford for $310,000 one year later, Ms. Olin will have to pay 
$90,000 to the city of Chicago.  Second, Ms. Olin will have to pay 
higher taxes on Blackacre for so long as she holds the property.  For 
purposes of simplifying this example, we assume that the taxes will 
be paid on nominal values.22  Thus, Ms. Olin will receive a tax bill 
based upon the self-assessed value of $400,000 rather than the former 
tax roll assessment of $200,000.  Half of Ms. Olin’s tax bill will be 
paid to the municipality (in accordance with the $200,000 originally 
on the tax roll).  The other half (representing the difference between 
the $400,000 declared value and the original $200,000) will be paid to 
Ms. Olin’s charity of choice – naturally, the Federalist Society.   
As the example shows, small adjustments to the self-assessment 
mechanism may be necessary in order for it to remain effective over 
time.  In our example, we have overlooked the effects of inflation, 
shocks to the housing markets, and other factors that may require 
updating the self-assessed price.  In the main, we suggest that these 
factors can be dealt with by pegging the self-assessed price to an 
appropriate local housing price index.  The index would adjust prices 
both upward and downward, so that homeowners would not be unduly 
punished for downturns in the market, or unduly rewarded for upticks.  
Thus, in our example, if during the year following the self-
assessment, the local housing price index goes up by 6%, the self-
assessed value would similarly be increased by 6%, i.e., from 
$400,000 to $424,000.  Naturally, the index would have to be one 
measuring similar prices for similar assets in similar locations, in 
order to truly reflect the market changes on the self-assessed value.  
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 180 ((Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001).  For discussion 
of the mechanisms of tax assessment in Illinois, including Cook County, see Nina 
H. Tamburo, The Illinois Property Tax System: An Overview, 10 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 186 (1998). 
22 Our mechanism actually discounts the additional tax burden in order to take 
account of the gap between assessed and market value.  For further discussion, see 
infra Part II. 
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More importantly, in order to reduce possible distortions 
introduced by the property tax liability, relative, rather than nominal 
values should be used.  We introduce a mechanism that adjusts tax 
liabilities to government assessment practices later in the text.23 
Our proposed mechanism constitutes yet another contribution to 
the burgeoning law and economics literature on self-assessment.  This 
line of inquiry originated in Saul Levmore’s classic article on the 
possibility of using self-assessment as a mechanism for setting 
property tax rates.24  Several years ago, we proposed a self-
assessment mechanism for measuring the third party effects of 
governmental takings—a phenomenon we called “derivative 
takings.”25  Recently, Lee Anne Fennell suggested the utility of self-
priced options in a variety of property contexts such as nuisance 
control and conservation easements.26  As we discuss later, while 
Levmore’s mechanism was designed to resolve a different problem 
(undervaluation of properties for property taxes) than ours 
(undervaluation of properties for takings compensation), our 
mechanism owes a heavy intellectual debt to Levmore’s work, as well 
as others examining self-assessment.  To date, however, no one has 
attempted to devise a self-assessment mechanism capable of tackling 
the nettlesome challenge of ordinary eminent domain compensation, 
which continues to be the classic example of the limits of self-
assessment.27  It is this void that this Article attempts to fill. 
The Article unfolds in four parts.  In Part I, we review the 
reigning theories of compensation and demonstrate why they mandate 
full and “just” compensation for government takings.  This Part 
examines the theoretical and practical flaws with market-based 
valuation for takings compensation, and pays particular attention to 
empirical data verifying the phenomenon of systematic 
undercompensation.  Part II presents our proposal for declaring 
subjective value.  Here we explain the mechanism, and compare it to 
other proposals for correcting undercompensation, as well as similar 
self-assessed pricing mechanisms.  Part III explores potential 
drawbacks and limitations, and compares our proposal to alternatives.  
A brief conclusion follows. 
 
23 See infra Part II. 
24 Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. 
L. REV. 771 (1982).  
25 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 271 
(2001). 
26 See Fennell, supra note 9. 
27 See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419 (invoking eminent domain compensation as a 
case where self-reporting will fail).  
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I.  WHY JUST COMPENSATION 
Eminent domain has long been accepted as an indispensable 
feature of the sovereign powers of government.  However, the 
immense scope of the government’s power to take is not without 
constitutional limits.  The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
enumerates two independent prerequisites to the exercise of eminent 
domain.  First, the government may only take private property for 
“public use.”  Second, the government must always pay “just 
compensation” in exchange for the taken property.   
In practice, the just compensation requirement has proved to be 
far more important than the public use limitation.  As the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed most recently in Kelo v. City of New London,28 
under federal constitutional law, virtually any governmental action 
that is otherwise permitted by constitution law will satisfy the public 
use requirement.  Notwithstanding a handful of notable exceptions,29 
federal constitutional law recognizes the states’ plenary powers to act 
in the interests of public health, safety, morals or general welfare.30  
The states’ powers in this regard – generally labeled “police 
powers”31 – permit the undertaking of such diverse actions as the 
confiscation and redistribution of private land holdings,32 and the 
imposition of comprehensive zoning plans that severely limit the 
ability to build upon and develop real estate holdings.33  Importantly, 
in Hawaii v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he “public use” 
requirement [of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause] is [] 
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”34  Thus, 
it is difficult to conceive of a state action against private property that 
would lack constitutional justification as being in service of a public 
use.35  Federal constitutional law has effectively eliminated the public 
use limitation on eminent domain.36 
 
28 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
29 Perhaps the most prominent exception is the dormant commerce clause, which 
prevents states from regulating interstate commercial activities. See, e.g., Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
30 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
31 See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 429 (2004). 
32 Hawaii v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
33 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379. 
34 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. 
35 The police power is the state’s regulatory power.  D. Benjamin Barros, The Police 
Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMA L. REV. 471 (2004).  The courts grant 
nearly unlimited discretion to the state’s regulation of economic affairs.  RONALD 
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Given the limited importance of the “public use” clause, the just 
compensation requirement remains the only meaningful constitutional 
safeguard against unlimited use of the eminent domain power.  Not 
surprisingly, the duty to pay just compensation has been analyzed by 
numerous scholars, and a number of competing theories have been 
proposed to explain its purpose and scope.  Following convention, we 
divide these theories into two major groupings: fairness-based 
justifications and efficiency-based justifications.   
A. Fairness-Based Justifications 
The Supreme Court announced a fairness-based justification for 
the compensation requirement in Armstrong v.  United States.37  Per 
Justice Black, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s [just compensation] 
guarantee … was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”38  Unfortunately, the Court 
refrained from elaborating the means by which such fairness could be 
determined. 
Into this void stepped Frank Michelman.39  Drawing heavily on 
the work of John Rawls, Michelman suggested that the fair 
compensation requirement represents the legal regime that the 
citizenry would have chosen behind a veil of ignorance.  Specifically, 
Michelman argued that the scope of the just compensation 
requirement is that which the citizenry would choose if it knew of a 
governmental power of eminent domain in the abstract but did not 
know how the burden of exercising that power would be distributed 
among the general public. 
Essentially, Michelman assumed that if people had no knowledge 
of what their future property holdings would be, they would 
 
ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE 
AND PROCEDURE § 15.4 (3d ed. 1986). 
36 In state law, public use requirements continue to have some significance. For 
example, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 415, 684 N. W. 2d 765 
(2004), the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that the use of eminent domain when 
private parties ultimately acquire the property is permissible only when: (1) there 
exists a “public necessity of the extreme sort” (highways, railroads, etc.); (2) the 
public retains continuing oversight authority over the use of the land; or (3) the 
property is selected based on “facts of independent public significance.”  See also 
Merrill, supra note 1. 
37 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
38 Id. at 49. 
39 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
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nevertheless have a shared notion of an acceptable risk of exposure to 
eminent domain.  Since Michelman developed his view before the 
important Supreme Court decision in Penn Central v. City of New 
York,40 it is difficult precisely to map his view onto current doctrine.41  
However, it is clear that Michelman believed that citizens would be 
willing to accept some risk of eminent domain – that is, Michelman’s 
citizenry would not require compensation for every taking.  Just as 
clearly, Michelman believed that citizens would not be willing to 
leave their property fully exposed to government taking.   
Michelman’s framework heavily relies on John Rawls’ Justice as 
Fairness.42  Rawls sought to uncover the terms of the hypothetical 
“social contract” at which rational, self-regarding and interdependent 
individuals would arrive behind “a veil of ignorance.”43  Rawls 
further assumed that the actors behind the veil of ignorance have 
information about the basic structure of society but lack knowledge 
about their personal traits and status in the real world.44  Rawls 
postulated that his thought experiment yields two principles for 
designing social institutions.  The first principle entitles each 
individual to the maximum liberty compatible with the exercise of a 
like liberty by others.45  The second principle (widely known as the 
“difference principle”) sanctions deviations from the first principle so 
long as the positions subject to the differential treatment are open to 
everyone, and the unequal treatment yields the greatest advantage for 
the least well off members of the group.46 
Applying the two principles in the takings context, Michelman 
posited that the first prohibits “all efficiency-motivated social 
undertakings, which have the prima facie effect of impairing 
‘liberties’ unequally, unless corrective measures (compensation 
 
40 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
41 Some of Michelman’s analysis appears to have been incorporated in part by the 
Penn Central court.  Id. at 128. 
42 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958). John Rawls further elaborate his theory at book-length.  
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  
43 Id. at 136-42.  
44 Id. .  
45 Id. at 60-65. 
46 Id.  George Klosko notes that “[t]here are differences in Rawls's presentation of 
the principles between ‘Justice as Fairness’ and later works. In particular, the 
second principle in ‘Justice as Fairness’ is stated in terms of the advantage of 
everyone, rather than the least advantaged.” George Klosko, Rawls’s Argument 
From Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1882, 1882 n.4 (1994). It bears 
emphasis that Michelman’s article predated the publication of A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE, and therefore relied on “Justice As Fairness.” 
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payments) are employed to equalize impacts.”47  The second, 
however, justifies departures from the rule of full compensation “if it 
could be shown that some other rule should be expected to work out 
best for each person insofar as his interests are affected by the social 
undertakings giving rise to occasions of compensation.”48  Under 
what circumstances, then, would a “less-than-full-compensation” be 
fair?  In answering this question, Michelman first identified the key 
parameters that affect the analysis.  The first parameter – “settlement 
costs” – denotes the cost of calculating and paying compensation to 
aggrieved owners.49  The second – “demoralization costs” – 
represents the psychological harm incomplete compensation 
occasions on condemnees and their sympathizers, and the forgone 
investment in property across the board that stems from the fear of 
undercompensatory takings.50 
A stringent compensation regime invariably entails high 
settlement costs that would occasionally thwart welfare enhancing 
projects.  Hence, such a regime will in some cases leave everyone 
worse off, including the least advantageous members of our society.  
A lax compensation regime, by contrast, will allow efficient 
developments projects to proceed but only at the cost of imposing a 
disproportionate portion of the cost on certain members of our 
society.  Hence, a lax compensation regime may generate high 
demoralization costs.  Michelman suggested that compensation 
should be paid when settlement costs are low, the gains from the 
government action are dubious and “the harm concentrated on one 
individual is unusually great.”51  On the other hand, compensation 
may be denied when property owners who are burdened by the 
government action also benefit from it or when the burden falls on the 
shoulders of many people.52  Although it does not explicitly say this, 
subsequent commentators interpreted Michelman’s analysis as 
suggesting that government pay compensation when demoralization 
costs exceed settlement costs but not otherwise.53 
At the end of the day, Michelman’s position appears to be that 
while not all takings (broadly defined) require the payment of 
compensation, in those cases where compensation ought to be paid, it 
must be paid in full.  Michelman’s analysis strikes a balance among 
 
47 Michelman, supra note 39, at 1221. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 1214. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 1223.  
52 Id.  
53 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 36 (2002).  
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the competing interest implicated in takings law by exempting the 
government from the duty to compensate for many acts that adversely 
affect property value.  But in instances when the duty to compensate 
does arise, property owners should be fully compensated for their 
losses.  The payment of less than full compensation in such cases 
would seem to violate the demands of fairness.54 
Margaret Radin developed an alternative framework for 
evaluating the fairness of takings compensation.55  Radin based her 
analysis on her understanding of Freidrich Hegel’s personhood 
theory.  Hegel’s work highlighted the link between property and the 
self.  To Hegel, property constituted the mechanism by which humans 
achieve self-actualization.  He believed that the human will required 
material objects to manifest itself and that without them individual 
freedom could not exist.56  Building on Hegel’s theory, Radin 
introduced an important distinction between personal and fungible 
property.57  She divided the world of objects into two categories: 
nonfungible and fungible.58  Nonfungible goods, such as a wedding 
ring or family home are constitutive of their owners' personality and 
hence create special value for their owners above and beyond market 
value.59  Fungible objects, by contrast, lack uniqueness and serve no 
purpose in constituting the self.60  Radin argued that property law 
should respect the distinction between fungible and nonfungible 
goods and treat the two differentially.61   
Accordingly, Radin argued that compensation at market value 
would often not suffice for the needs of justice.  She proposed that 
owners have the right to injunctive relief, or property rule protection, 
in cases involving nonfungible goods, while compensatory damages, 
 
54 It should be noted that Hanoch Dagan advances a different interpretation of 
Michelman.  Working from a distributive justice perspective but relying heavily on 
Michelman, Dagan proposes that takings compensation be used a means of wealth 
redistribution.  Specifically, he argues that compensation amounts should be 
adjusted to the recipient’s wealth.  On Dagan’s proposal, poor condemnees will be 
entitled to a compensation award greater than the market value of their property, 
whereas affluent condemnees will receive less than market value.  See Hanoch 
Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999).  For criticism, 
see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response 
to Professor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 157 (2000). 
55 Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
56 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶39-45 (T. M. Knox 
trans. 1967) (1821). 
57 Radin, supra note 55.  
58 Id. at 960. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 986. 
61 Id. 
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or liability rule protection, would be applied to all other cases.62  
Radin explicitly noted that the personality theory would support 
extending property rule protection to “a special class of property like 
a family home.63  And elsewhere, she wrote that compensation at 
market value “seem[s] quite wrong in cases where property interests 
are apprehended as personal and incommensurate with money”;64 in 
such cases paying market value would be insufficient.  Hence, the 
personality theory also rejects compensation at fair market for family 
homes and other personality laden assets and supports substituting the 
existing compensation measure for a higher award, or in some cases, a 
complete ban on the taking.   
B. Efficiency-Based Justifications 
Efficiency-based justifications for takings compensation are both 
numerous and controversial.  All such justifications hold as a premise 
that governmental decisions to take property cannot be held ex ante to 
be efficient.  As Louis Kaplow has argued, if the government is 
presumed always to act efficiently, takings compensation is counter-
productive because it creates moral hazard; i.e., it encourages owners 
to build too much, without taking account of the likelihood of 
government takings.65  However, once the possibility of inefficient 
governmental decisionmaking is acknowledged, just compensation 
plays an important role in encouraging efficient takings. 
1. Fiscal Illusion 
The most prominent efficiency-based explanation for 
compensation references fiscal illusion.  Fiscal illusion is the 
presumed habit of government decisionmakers of ignoring costs that 
do not directly affect government inflows and outflows.  When 
operating under fiscal illusion, a state actor ignores any costs of her 
action to private property owners resulting from takings, aside from 
 
62 See id. at 988 (“[T]here would be a nice simplicity in hypothesizing that personal 
property should be protected by property rules and that fungible property should be 
protected by liability rules.”). 
63 Id. at 1005-06. In the alternative, she noted that such a limitation has not 
developed.  
64 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 154 (1993). Radin further 
notes that “In such cases it may be difficult to decide whether compensatory justice 
requires higher compensation or whether no compensation should be paid because 
the problem is outside the scope of compensatory justice." Id. 
65 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 614-17 (1986). See also, Lawrence Blume & Perry Shapiro, Compensation for 
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984). 
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those that appear in the budget (such as lower tax yields).  Thus, 
government actors suffering from fiscal illusion see most of the 
benefits engendered by uncompensated takings, but few of the costs.  
Takings without compensation enhance the government coffers by 
adding property holdings without significant cost.66  However, when 
compensation is not paid, most costs are borne by the private property 
owners.  Consequently, if government could take without paying 
compensation, it would take too much. 
The constitutional requirement of just compensation fixes the 
problem by forcing the government to include private costs in 
government budgets.  Once the budget fully reflects social costs and 
benefits, fiscal illusion no longer distorts the decisionmaking process. 
This can be seen by way of example.  Imagine that the state is 
considering condemning land, currently used for various industrial 
purposes, in order to build a toll road.  The road will produce benefits 
to the public of $10 million, of which the state will recapture the full 
amount in tolls.  Construction costs for the road are $8 million.  In 
private hands, the land produces $9 million for the industrial owners; 
consequently, the land is worth $9 million on the open market.  By 
efficiency criteria, the state should not build the road.  The road 
produces only $10 million in benefits, but costs $17 million (i.e., $8 
million in construction costs, and $9 million in lost industrial output).  
However, that is not how the transaction is viewed by a state actor 
that suffers from fiscal illusion.  If the state operates under fiscal 
illusion, and need not pay takings compensation, it will build the road, 
because the road produces $10 million of benefits for the state budget, 
at a cost of only $8 million on-budget.  Mandating takings 
compensation overcomes this problem by forcing the state to take 
account of the full measure of costs engendered by the project.  The 
fiscal illusion-afflicted state that must pay compensation will take 
account of $10 million in benefits and $17 million in costs, and make 
the efficient decision not to produce the road. 
To fully overcome the distorting effects of fiscal illusion, takings 
law must mandate full compensation for losses suffered by the owners 
of the taken property.  If the government need pay only for market 
value, but not for idiosyncratic or subjective value, the theory of fiscal 
illusion posits that the government will take too much, since it will 
ignore subjective and idiosyncratic value destroyed by the taking. 
 
66 The important costs for uncompensated takings are administrative costs, and the 
lost tax revenue from the now-public property. 
SSRN WORKING PAPER © 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 9/16/2005  2:09 PM 
 BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION 17 
This can be seen by revising our earlier example.  Imagine that 
the road described above is designated to pass through a private 
residential area, rather than an industrial area.  Once again, anticipated 
benefits from the road are $10 million, all of which will be recovered 
by the state through tolls.  And, again, construction will cost $8 
million.  Market price of the residential properties is $1.5 million.  
However, resident families have lived in the area for generations, and 
have developed such great sentimental attachment to their homes that 
they would only sell them at twice the market price, i.e., $3 million.  
If the government need only pay market value compensation, it will 
make the inefficient decision to build the road, since it will take 
account of only $9.5 million in costs against $10 million in benefits.  
However, if the government must pay full compensation at the value 
of the property to its current owners, it will make the efficient 
decision not to build the road, since there is only a $10 million from 
construction, at a total cost of $12 million. 
To be sure, fiscal illusion provides only a partial explanation for 
the current state of compensation law.  Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the fiscal illusion justification calls for a much more 
vigorous compensation policy than that currently employed.  As we 
noted in a previous essay, many of the costs occasioned by 
government takings are indirect, falling upon third parties who suffer 
losses due to government acts even though their property is not taken 
directly.  Thus, the theory of fiscal illusion calls for full compensation 
for derivative takings.67  By the same token, there is no reason to 
suspect that fiscal illusion afflicts only decisions to effectuate the 
power of eminent domain (i.e., physical takings).  While not 
subscribing to a theory based upon fiscal illusion, Richard Epstein has 
observed that government actions affecting private property and 
wealth are ubiquitous, and certainly extend far beyond traditional 
exercises of eminent domain.68  To address concerns of fiscal illusion, 
the compensation requirement for takings would have to extend to 
many government actions well beyond ordinary physical and 
regulatory takings.  Moreover, as we wrote in a previous article, since 
many of the benefits of government takings find no expression in the 
governmental budget, a theory of fiscal illusion calls for the 
assessment of charges for benefits conferred by government givings.69 
 
67 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 25. 
68 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 10 (1985).  
69 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 585. 
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None of this, however, suggests that full compensation should not 
be offered.  The gaps in treating the effects of fiscal illusion merely 
suggest that there are many cases in which takings law is deficient in 
failing to pay compensation or assess charges.  None of the gaps 
suggests that partial compensation is a preferable rule.  On the 
contrary, absent a more cost-effective means for ensuring efficient 
takings decisions by the government, the best means for combating 
fiscal illusion is requiring that the government fully internalize the 
costs of takings. 
2. Moral Hazard 
The economic case for the payment of compensation in order to 
combat fiscal illusion has been countered by commentators argue that 
economic analysis actually requires not paying any compensation in 
order to avoid creating moral hazard.  Theories of moral hazard posit 
that where the government insures individuals against economic loss 
resulting from some kinds of harm, the government incentivizes 
individuals to engage in excessively risky activities.  For example, 
where the government provides disaster relief funds for properties that 
are destroyed by floods, it incentivizes private homeowners to build 
too may houses in flood plains, as they need not take full account of 
the risk that floods will destroy the homes.  Moral hazard arises 
whenever that the insured actor has the ability to prevent or mitigate 
the harm by any means, including refraining from engaging in the 
activity altogether. 
In the context of takings compensation, theories of moral hazard 
suggest that full recompense distorts property owners’ incentives.  
Property owners may over-develop property at risk of government 
taking, knowing that they will receive compensation for any taking.  
On the one hand, the owners know that they will enjoy the full upside 
of any increased value resulting from the development if there is no 
taking.  On the other hand, the owners do not have to worry about 
recouping development costs if the government seizes the property, 
because the government will have to pay compensation for the value 
of the property as developed.   
To alleviate the moral hazard created by takings compensation, 
some commentators have argued for either no compensation, or 
reduced compensation for takings.  Louis Kaplow, incorporating an 
analysis of eminent domain into a larger study of “transitions” – 
government policy changes that impose gains and losses on private 
actors – opined that the optimal amount of takings compensation is 
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none.70  A similar result was reached by Lawrence Blume, Daniel 
Rubenfeld and Perry Shapiro, in circumstances where the decision to 
take is independent of the use to which the property is put.71  Both 
studies assumed that government policies are made efficiently and are 
not affected by fiscal illusion.72 
However, once these unrealistic assumptions are relaxed, the no-
compensation recommendation can no longer be sustained.  Blume, 
Rubenfeld and Shapiro explicitly recognized that a government that is 
susceptible to fiscal illusion would make inefficient decisions unless it 
paid full compensation.73  In other words, any policy of less than full 
compensation at subjective value (except for the value of inefficient 
development) will fail to incentivize the government properly.   
The problem – a familiar one in such fields as torts and contracts 
– is how the law can simultaneously incentivize opposing parties who 
can each mitigate harm.  In takings cases, full compensation 
incentivizes the government not to take recklessly, but encourages 
property owners to develop recklessly.  Incomplete compensation 
may discourage reckless development, but will lead the government 
to take too much.  In torts, this problem is resolved by creating a 
negligence standard for at least one of the parties.  For instance, to 
assure that both potential tortfeasors and victims take due care to 
mitigate possible harms, tort law will often adopt a rule of 
contributory negligence, barring recovery when the victim negligently 
contributed to the accident.74  By exposing the tortfeasor to strict 
liability or liability based on negligence, and simultaneously barring 
recovery for a contributorily negligent victim, the law achieves what 
 
70 See Kaplow, supra note 65, at 614-17 (1986). 
71 Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: 
When Should Compensation Be Paid? 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984).  Thomas Miceli 
emphasized the flip side of this observation—excessive development may deter 
takings where full compensation is required.  Thus, a full compensation regime can 
ensure optimal land use.   Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land 
Under Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 354 (1991). 
72 Kaplow, supra note 65, at 521; Blume, et al., supra note 71, at 81. 
73 Blume, et al., supra note 71, at 88. 
74 The economic incentive effects of tort law have been widely analyzed.  Among 
the important works are GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Prather 
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); 
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); 
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
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Robert Cooter calls “double responsibility at the margin,” or optimal 
incentives for both parties.75 
Elsewhere, one of us has suggested a contributory negligence 
standard for takings compensation that would bar recovery for 
reckless overdevelopment of property and thereby achieve double 
responsibility at the margin.76  Blume, Rubenfeld and Shapiro posited 
that this result could be achieved by requiring lump sum 
compensation at an amount approximating full value of the property 
absent excessive development.  In substance, these proposals are 
identical, albeit under different terminology.77  Either way, full 
compensation leads to the most efficient results, so long as 
compensation is not paid for excessive development. 
While current law does not bar recovery for excessive 
development, the existence of takings blight strongly suggests that 
this is not a serious problem.78  Thus, it is difficult to argue that moral 
hazard presents a strong argument for less-than-full compensation. 
3. Public Choice and Interest Group Payoffs 
A different efficiency justification – based in the arena of 
political economy – was advanced Daniel Farber.79  Like Kaplow, 
Farber proceeded from an assumption of the efficiency of initial 
government decisions to take property by eminent domain.  However, 
Farber assumed a more complicated political process, modeled on the 
insights of public choice theory.  In Farber’s model, an initial efficient 
proposal to take property for the benefit of society would not be 
implemented until approved by a political process ruled by interest 
groups.  Here, Farber posited, efficient takings would be likely 
 
75 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985). 
76 Bell, supra note 2, at 48. 
77 Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro provocatively write that in an environment of 
fiscal illusion coupled with moral hazard, “no compensation is suboptimal, but so is 
the payment of full compensation.”  Blume, et al, supra note 71, at 88.  This 
statement is somewhat misleading, as it refers to the inefficiency caused by payment 
of full compensation inclusive of all development, including reckless 
overdevelopment.  In a separate article, Blume and Shapiro more explicitly 
suggested that moral hazard could be eliminated by adjusting compensation to 
eliminate rewards for inefficient development.  Blume & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 
619. 
78 See infra Part I.C.2. 
79 Farber’s article does not rely solely on the public choice/rent-seeking account 
presented here; indeed, Farber acknowledged the plausibility of other economic 
explanations for the compensation requirement.  Daniel A. Farber, Economic 
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137 (1992). 
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blocked absent the payment of compensation.  This is due to the 
probable way government actions based upon eminent domain will 
distribute costs and benefits.  In Farber’s view, the usual case involves 
a small number of affected properties to be taken, with widely spread 
public benefits.  Thus, the owners of properties designated for taking 
will comprise a well-motivated and small interest group, while the 
benefiting public will be scattered and poorly motivated (as the 
benefits for any individual member of the public will be small).80   
Implicitly relying upon Mancur Olson’s theory of the superior 
political power of minority interest groups,81 Farber suggested that 
absent compensation for government takings, targeted property 
owners will systematically foil societally beneficial government 
actions in order to block personal loss.  Farber argued that 
compensation combats the power of this powerful property owner 
interest group by paying it off.82  Once targeted property owners are 
mollified by compensation payments, they will remove their 
objections to socially beneficial projects, and permit them to move 
forward. 
While Farber does not address the question of how much 
compensation must be paid, it seems clear that the anchor should be 
full compensation.  If targeted property owners are systematically 
undercompensated, they will be left with a high incentive to lobby 
against beneficial government projects.  The lobby will only be safely 
neutralized when it is indifferent to the taking, because it has been 
fully compensated for the loss occasioned by the taking. 
C. The Flaws In Market Compensation 
Thus far, we have seen that, whether based in explanations of 
fairness or efficiency, theories of takings compensation mandate full 
recompense for the taken property at its value to the erstwhile owner.  
Yet, there are a number of ways in which compensation at market 
value falls short of this goal of full compensation.  In this section, we 
discuss several types of value excluded from compensation under 
current doctrine:  subjective value, goodwill and “takings blight.”83  
 
80 Id. at 133-38.  
81 Mancur Olson, Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965). 
82 Farber, supra note 79, at 125 (“Public choice theory suggests that legislators 
normally offer compensation to landowners whose property is taken for a project, 
because they would form a powerful lobby against the project if not ‘bought off.’”). 
83 As we shall explain in greater detail, below…, we use the term “takings blight” to 
refer to the difference between the property’s market value prior to the 
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In addition, we look at the adverse effects of transaction costs, 
particularly litigation costs. 
1. Subjective Value and Goodwill 
For fungible goods with readily available market substitutes there 
should be no substantial gap between market value and the subjective 
value of the owner.  However, many types of property do not share 
this characteristic.  For example, perfect substitutes for a family home 
may rarely be found on the market.84  For one, location, construction 
and layouts naturally differ from home to home.  In addition, owners 
often enjoy additional enjoy from unique experiences and memories 
associated with the homestead.85  Consequently, when government 
takes residential property it often wipes out substantial subjective 
value in excess of market value.  Many scholars have recognized the 
gap between subjective and market value, albeit occasionally under 
different names.86  James Krier and Christopher Serkin, for example, 
note that takings law fails to compensate for the gap between 
subjective and market values, and label it the consumer surplus.87 
In addition, as Margaret Radin noted, the gap between subjective 
and market value may be found not only with respect to residential 
homes but also in the case of other assets.  She uses the example of a 
wedding band as the paradigm of personal property for which market 
substitute will not do.  Of course, takings of personal property such as 
wedding bands are so rare by comparison to condemnations of 
residential homes that we elect to focus on the latter.  At the same 
time, it is important to recognize that not every taking of real estate 
results in a significant loss of subjective value.  For instance, the 
taking of a nondescript warehouse in an area where similar 
warehouses may be obtained is unlikely to occasion a loss of excess 
subjective value.88 
 
government’s announcement of its intent to take, and the subsequent lower value at 
the time compensation is actually set. The difference stems is due to the fact that the 
announcement in and of itself depresses property values.   
84 Many unique variables come together to form a family’s home, and it is difficult 
or even impossible to replicate all of them in another perfect substitute available on 
the market. 
85 The value of stable ownership should be distinguished from the “endowment 
effect,” which causes individuals to value goods in their possession more than 
identical goods in someone else’s possession. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a 
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).  
86 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1; 4-12 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01. 
87 Krier & Serkin, supra, note 1, at 866 . 
88 Of course, warehouses can exhibit some of the same personalized characteristics 
as a family home, and so may also exhibit increased subjective value. 
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Finally, even without the likelihood of any idiosyncratic value, 
sentimental businesses may be harmed by the standard rules of market 
value compensation.  Businesses often have values as going concerns 
above the summed values of their assets.  The gap between the value 
of the business as a whole and the assets comprising the business is 
called “goodwill” and it represents the unique value of the business as 
a going concern.89  Many states do not compensate for lost goodwill,90 
and, as interpreted by the courts, the constitutional standard of “just 
compensation” does not require compensation for this head of 
damages.91 
2. Takings “Blight” 
Generally, compensation is paid for the value of property as of 
the day it is actually taken, rather than the day on which the taking 
was announced.  Not surprisingly, these values may differ greatly.  
Businesses will not invest in a new property consequent to the 
announcement of a taking, as any the value of any built-up goodwill 
will disappear on the day of the taking.  Similarly, purchasers of 
residential properties looking for a stable long-term home will avoid 
the area.  As Gideon Kanner has noted, the announcement of a 
pending government taking often results in the precipitous decline of 
property values in the targeted neighborhood.  Many sales are 
“distress sales,” while buyers are limited to those interested in short 
term uses only.92  This phenomenon, known as “planning blight” or 
“condemnation blight,” is the result of the impairment of 
marketability caused by the knowledge that any ownership interest in 
the property is short-lived.93 
While three doctrines of takings compensation have been 
proposed to deal with this lost value, none has provided a complete 
solution.  The first of the three doctrines recognizes the rights of 
 
89 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 306 (2005).  
90 See, e.g., Michigan State Highway Commission v. Gaffield, 108 Mich. App. 88, 
310 N.W.2d 281 (1981); City of Dunkirk v. Conti, 186 A.D.2d 1012, 588 N.Y.S.2d 
465 (4th Dep't 1992); State v. Rogers, 772 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1989).  
91 See, e.g., U.S. v. 0.88 Acres of Land, 670 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mich. 1987); State 
v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (1960); Williams v. State Highway 
Commission, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960). 
92 Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the Supreme Court Been 
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. 
LAW 307 (1998).  
93 See Robert H. Freilich, Planning Blight: The Anglo-American Experience, 29 
URB. LAW. vii, xii (1997).  Freilich distinguishes between planning and 
condemnation blight on the grounds that the latter is caused when “condemnation is 
inevitable—as opposed to the former, where condemnation is merely a possibility.” 
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aggrieved property owners to compensation for “de facto takings.”  A 
de facto taking occurs whenever the state excessively interferes with 
property rights without carrying out a declared seizure by eminent 
domain.  The category of de facto takings is a broad one, and includes 
regulatory takings, physical invasions and denial of access.94  Some 
courts have extended the concept to include particularly egregious 
instances of condemnation blight.95  Many cases, however, have 
refused to find that a takings declaration amounts to a de facto taking, 
even where the declaration itself leads to loss of property value.96   
Some states utilize a second doctrine permitting the court to roll 
back the date of measuring market value to the date that the 
government declared its intention to confiscate the property.97  This 
doctrine produces results very similar to the de facto takings 
doctrine—the de facto takings doctrine moves back the date of the 
recognized taking, while the valuation rollback doctrine moves back 
the date of the valuation, while leaving the recognized takings date in 
place.  However, most states agree that the correct valuation date is 
the date of the taking, leaving compensation blight uncompensated.98  
The scope of the project doctrine does not focus on compensation 
dates; instead, it posits that the state does not have to pay 
compensation for value created by the government project prompting 
the taking.  Thus, if a government project raises the value of land to 
be taken for it, the government may discount from the compensation 
award all increases attributable to the project.99  The scope of the 
project rule may also be used by property owner-compensation 
 
94 See 2A-6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (2005). 
95 See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). 
96 See, e.g., Veillon v Lafayette, 467 So 2d 184 (La App 3d Cir 1985) (mayor’s and 
project agent’s declaration to homeowners that their home will be taken in order to 
facilitate transportation project does not constitute a taking). 
97 Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282 (Wash. 1976) (valuation must be at an earlier time 
than the date of the trial to achieve just compensation); City of Buffalo v. J.W. 
Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 257, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 355, 269 N.E.2d 895, 905, 
reh'g denied, 29 N.Y.2d 640, 324 N.Y.S.2d 315, 273 N.E.2d 315 (1971), appeal 
dismissed, 31 N.Y.2d 958, 341 N.Y.S2d 104, 293 N.E.2d 252 (1972) (property 
owner may introduce evidence of “affirmative value-depressing acts” by 
government agency in order to increase valuation). 
98 See 8A-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.04 (2005). 
99 See, e.g. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 
470, 477-78 (1973) (“Government must pay just compensation [only] for those 
interests ‘probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government 
was committed to it.’”); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276, 87 L. 
Ed. 336 (1943); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 
53, 190 N.E.2d 52, 5 A.L.R.3d 891 (1963). 
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claimants to support the argument that the owner is entitled to 
payment for the diminution of value caused by the takings 
announcement.  However, this is not the usual application of the rule. 
Most importantly, in Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, the 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional 
requirement of just compensation does not include payment for 
condemnation blight.100   
3. Bargaining, Litigation and Transaction Costs 
Private property rights activists allege that the 
undercompensation problem is further exacerbated by the 
government’s superior bargaining position in its negotiations with 
owners.  It is often the practice of the government to try to negotiate a 
voluntary transfer, prior to resorting to eminent domain.  A voluntary 
settlement is advantageous for the government as it saves the 
government potential litigation costs as well as negative publicity.  
Private property rights champions and eminent domain practitioners 
caution, however, that the settlement amount offered by the 
government in pre-takings negotiations is much lower than the fair 
market value and owners who agree to accept it receive lower 
compensation than their neighbors who refuse the offer, and seek 
instead legal determination of just compensation.  Various anecdotal 
horror stories about government’s abuse of its bargaining power are 
brought to substantiate this claim. 
For example, in a recent eminent domain case from Virginia, the 
local board of commissioners awarded a farmer approximately 
2,000% of the initial government appraisal for his land ($2.4 million 
instead of $112,000).101  Similarly, a jury awarded the owner of one 
of the properties that was condemned for the construction of General 
Motor’s Poletown plant in Detroit almost 1,500% of the initial 
government offer ($5.1 million instead of $357,000).102  According to 
another report, “[f]or years, the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation has taken private land for road projects and offered the 
owners substantially less than the land was worth.”103  Occasionally, 
the Department of Transportation commissioned more than one 
appraisal and chose to negotiate with property owners based on a low 
appraisal without disclosing the existence of higher estimates.  
 
100 Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 
101 See http://www.vafb.com/news/2005/april/042105_1.htm.  The case is likely to 
be appealed.  
102 See http://www.ackerman-ackerman.com/case2.html.  
103 Browning, supra note 14. 
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Property owners complained that these “‘low-ball’ offers have 
compelled them to spend thousands of dollars to get their own 
appraisals, hire attorneys and fight for a fair price for land they didn't 
even want to sell.”104  For example, one family rejected a $175,000 it 
had received from the agency, hired an attorney and eventually won 
an award of $420,000 but the legal battle cost $53,000 in appraisal 
and attorney fees.105  Other Minnesotans whose land was condemned 
complained that the “high cost of fighting forced to settle for less than 
they deserve” and that even those who ultimately received fair market 
value “c[a]me out behind, financially.”106  Others stories of low-
balling abound. Indeed, the conventional wisdom among eminent 
domain practitioners is that government will always try to get land on 
the cheap. 
But are these stories representative?  Or more importantly, do 
they really prove the existence of widespread undercompensation?  
The answer is probably no.  There is nothing particularly surprising 
about the fact that government seeks to get land on the cheap.  After 
all, at least on some accounts, the government’s motivation is to pay 
as little as possible.  Evidence that the government often makes low 
initial offers, however, does not prove that the final amount paid is 
also low.  The initial offer is merely the opening salvo in a long legal 
battle. 
The only empirical study on takings compensation depicts a 
picture far more nuanced and complicated than various private 
property rights activists would have us believe.  In her study of 
eminent domain compensation in Chicago, Patricia Munch found that 
current compensation doctrine leads to both undercompensation, and 
overcompensation: owners of high-value properties tend to get 
overcompensated while owners of low-value lots often receive 
undercompensation.107  Munch theorized that what accounts for this 
result is the presence of symmetric litigation costs and the inadvertent 
cross-subsidies of government legal costs.   
Like private property owners, the government stands to incur 
litigation costs when its attempt to secure consensual transfer fails.  
However, the calculus of private property owners is dramatically 
different than that of the government.  Since each owner has only one 
lot at stake, her decision about how much to invest in legal 
representation depends directly on the value of the lot.  Owners of 
 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Munch, supra note 11. 
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high value lots who have a lot at stake have an incentive to hire top 
legal advisors, while owners of low value lots obtain lower quality 
legal representation.  By contrast, the government engages in 
numerous legal proceedings, and it has a permanent staff of lawyers 
on standby.  These lawyers are paid a steady salary, and do not 
receive differential compensation based on the value of the 
condemned property.  Rather, the government pays an optimal 
amount for its legal staff when averaged over the total expected cost 
of eminent domain cases, meaning that in any individual case, the 
government will probably pay too much or too little.  In low value 
cases, the government lawyers are probably overqualified, and the 
government effectively overpays for legal representation.  
Conversely, for high value cases, the government lawyers are 
probably under-qualified, and the government receives inadequate 
representation.  Consequently, the government’s legal counsel will 
likely outperform the owner’s counsel for low-value property, while 
being outperformed by the lawyers of high-value property owners. 
Munch found that “as a rough approximation, a $7000 parcel 
receives about $5000, a $13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000 
parcel may get two or three times its market value.”108  Thus, she 
characterized eminent domain as “a tax on low-valued and a subsidy 
on high-valued properties.”109  This distributive result is, to say the 
least, unattractive. 
Although Munch’s work fails to support the belief that the 
government pays sub-market prices due to a superior bargaining 
position, many states have enacted legislation designed to “restore” 
the balance between property owners and government.  Nearly twenty 
states offer some kinds of subsidy of condemnees’ litigation expenses.  
Some states leave the subsidies to the court’s discretion, and some 
allow only the payment of certain kinds of expenses, such as expert 
witness fees.110  Others, however, require the payment of litigation 
expenses where the final compensation award substantially exceeds 
the government’s initial offer.111  No state specifically addresses the 
distributive problems identified by Munch.  
 
108 Id. at 488.   The estimates are based on a study of land acquisitions by the 
Chicago Department of Urban Renewal from 1962-1970.  Id. at 485. 
109 Id. at 488. 
110 The laws of at least three other states – Colorado, Minnesota, and New 
Hampshire – allow condemnees to recover expert fees. See Keller v. Miller, 165 
P.774, 776 (Colo. 1917); MINN. STAT. § 117.175(2); NH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-
A:27, Appeal of the Ribblesdale, Inc., 513 A.2d 360 (N.H.1986).  
111 16 states have enacted statutes that award full or partial reimbursement for court 
costs and attorney’s fees to private property owners in eminent domain litigation. 
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II.  SELF-ASSESSMENTS AND COMPENSATION 
Our discussion thus far has demonstrated two central points. 
First, as a general rule, fairness and efficiency theories require 
payment of full compensation at the property owner’s value in those 
cases where compensation is warranted.112 Second, existing 
compensation doctrine does not ensure property owners full 
compensation. In this Part, we propose an alternative compensation 
mechanism that aligns compensation practice with the demands of 
efficiency and fairness. In explaining our mechanism, we will 
highlight its advantages relative to existing compensation doctrine. In 
addition, we will show how it may be used not only for government 
declared takings but also in inverse condemnation actions, including 
those asserting the existence of a regulatory taking. Finally, we will 
place our proposal within the burgeoning literature on self-assessment 
and information revealing valuation mechanisms.   
A. An Alternative Proposal 
Obviously, the payment of full compensation to owners requires 
knowing the value that owners attach to their property.  While the 
market value component is both observable and verifiable by third 
parties, the additional surplus enjoyed by the particular owner is 
generally not.  Hence, to compensate owners for their additional 
surplus the legal system must rely on nonverifiable information 
supplied by owners.  Herein lies the rub.  Where the owner’s 
testimony serves as the basis for determining compensation awards, 
 
Generally speaking, Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin mandate such award when the litigation results 
in a greater award to the condemnee. See ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 72(k)(3); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 73.092; IOWA CODE § 6B.33; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.66(3); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 70-30-305; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7)(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-
23; WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b); WIS. STAT. § 32.28(3)(d). It should be 
noted that most of these states require the compensation awarded by trial to be 
greater than the relevant government offer by a margin of 10% to 30%. California, 
Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and South 
Carolina give courts discretion to award court costs and attorney fees to successful 
condemnees, but do not mandate such action. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 
1268.710 & 1268.720; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6111; IDAHO CODE § 7-711A(8); 
KAN. STAT. § 26-509; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 19:8 & 19:109 (attorney fees only); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 76-720; N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701; OKLA. STAT. tit. 27 § 
11(3); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510(3). Some states in this group also require the 
final award to exceed the relevant government offer by a certain margin. 
112 It should be clear that the question of which acts of government mandate 
compensation under the Takings Clause is a complicated one beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
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owners have every incentive to exaggerate.113  It is for this reason that 
compensation doctrine systematically disregards those components of 
surplus value that cannot be readily verified, such as subjective value.  
In a word, then, takings law pays less than full compensation for 
practical, rather than principled, reasons. 
In a classic article, Saul Levmore pointed a way out of this 
dilemma.  Drawing upon the experience of an income tax system that 
has relied on self-reporting for many years, Levmore noted that 
sufficient penalties can curb parties’ tendency to under-report their 
taxable income.  He then suggested importing the same approach to 
the context of property taxes by allowing owners to assess their own 
property value subject to penalties designed to deter underreporting.  
Specifically, to balance the tendency to underreport and reduce tax 
liability, Levmore suggested that self-reported value would also serve 
as the property’s sale price.  In other words, if the owner of Blackacre 
reported its value at $100 liability for purposes of property tax 
liability, anyone could force the owner to part with Blackacre in 
exchange for $100.  Importantly, Levmore included the government 
in the group of potential purchasers who could force a sale. 
Our proposal is in many ways the obverse of Levmore’s.  While 
Levmore’s main goal was to ensure higher tax revenues to the 
government, our goal is to guarantee full compensation to property 
owners.  As a result, by contrast to Levmore, the foremost challenge 
we face is over (rather than under-) reporting.  As we will explain 
later,114 property tax law and compensation law do not treat assessed 
property value identically.  Consequently, the shift in focus from tax 
law to eminent domain compensation has important policy 
ramifications.115 
In the remainder of this part, we lay out a simple mechanism that 
would allow property owners to recover the full value they place on 
their property in cases of eminent domain.  Once the government 
declares its intent to condemn a certain lot, the owner will be asked to 
report the value she attaches to the property.  After the owner submits 
her report, the government may either seize the property at the 
declared value or forego its plan to condemn that property.  To use 
finance terminology, under our proposal, the property owner gets to 
 
113 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419. 
114 See Part III.C., infra.   
115 In Part II.C., infra, we discuss Levmore’s proposal in greater detail and highlight 
many important differences between our proposal and his. 
SSRN WORKING PAPER © 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 9/16/2005  2:09 PM 
 BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION 30 
set the strike price for the government option to take.116  To deter 
over-reporting two restrictions will be imposed on owners of 
properties that the government chooses not to take.  First, the owners 
will not be able to transfer the property for less than the self-reported 
value.  Secondly, their property tax liability will be based on the self-
reported valuation. However, for reasons we explain shortly, the 
government will not collect the full amount paid by the owners. 
The two limitations we propose warrant further explanation.  The 
first limitation is essentially a partial inalienability restraint.  It does 
not fully bar owners from transferring their property.  Rather, it only 
sets a price floor (at the self-assessed amount) for transfer.  
Inalienability does not only apply to commercial sales but also to gifts 
and more generally to all fee simple transfers, in order to avoid 
fraudulent circumventions of the inalienability restriction.  The partial 
inalienability restraint will remain in force for seventy years,117 unless 
the owner transfers the property at the self-assessed price (or higher) 
in which event the restraint will expire.  The owner may overcome the 
inalienability restraint, however, by paying a redemption fee to the 
government at the time of an otherwise-forbidden transfer.  Where an 
owner seeks to transfer the property for less than the self-reported 
value, she may do so if she pays to the government a fee equal to the 
difference between the sale price and the self-reported value. 
The tax restraint is significantly more complicated.  Ordinarily, 
property taxes are set according to a value assessed by a government 
assessor, and have no connection with other values that might be 
assigned to the property by other government bodies.118  We do not 
propose changing this basic fact.  Only when the government 
indicates its intent to seize a particular parcel will our proposal come 
 
116 For a discussion of eminent domain as a call option see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL 
LAW 4 (2005).  
117 We suggest a period of seventy years in order to approximate a lifetime of 
ownership, without making the length of the partial inalienability period depend on 
the actual owner’s age.  We avoid an infinite partial inalienability period out of 
respect for property law’s general (and justified) dislike of absolute restraints on 
alienability. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 54 (5th ed. 
2002).  Additionally, we note that due to the effects of discounting future value, a 
seventy-year restraint will not be significantly less costly to owners than an infinite 
restraint.  We discuss the particular problems raised by elderly owners infra, in Part 
III.A. 
118 See e.g., Clifford H. Goodall & Seth A. Goodall, Property Tax: A Primer and a 
Modest Proposal for Maine, 57 ME. L. REV. 585, 597 (2005) (noting that “[m]odern 
property tax limits use a variety of techniques, including direct limits on revenue 
growth, levy limits, and property tax caps that indirectly limit tax revenue growth, 
as well as limiting growth rates for assessed values). . 
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into play.  Once the property owner has submitted her reported value 
for purposes of eminent domain, the property tax assessor will have to 
keep track of two values – the government-assessed value and the 
surplus, i.e., the amount by which the self-reported value exceeds the 
government-assessed value.  The government-assessed value will 
continue to serve as the basis of the regular property tax bill.  
However, there will be an additional property tax assessed on the 
surplus.  This additional property tax will not be paid to the 
government; instead, the property owner will be free to donate it to a 
charity of her choice.   This can be implemented by simple 
mechanisms such as a check-off box in the property tax bill.119  Like 
the inalienability restraint, the surplus tax liability should end once the 
property is transferred. 
The rate at which the surplus will be taxed can best be explained 
in two stages.  Consider first the possibility of taxing the surplus at its 
nominal value, at the same rate as the government-assessed value.  
For example, consider a property with a government-assessed value 
of $200,000, market value of $250,000, and self-reported value of 
$300,000.  Additionally, assume that the property tax rate is 1% of 
assessed value.  Under this option, the owner would have to pay a tax 
of $2,000 (1% of the government assessed value of $200,000) to the 
government, and an additional tax of $1,000 (1% of the surplus of 
$100,000) to a charity of the owner’s choice.   
We suggest, however, taxing the surplus at an assessment-
adjusted rate, rather than at nominal value.  Specifically, rather than 
pay tax on the full amount of the surplus, the owner should pay tax 
only on the difference between self-reported value and market value, 
further discounted to reflect the ratio between assessed and market 
value.  This can best be understood by returning to the previous 
example.  As noted above, the nominal value of the surplus is 
$100,000 (self-reported value minus government-assessed value), and 
the tax due would therefore be $1,000 under a nominal surplus tax.  
However, under our proposal, the taxable amount is based only on the 
discounted value of the owner premium.  Specifically, we first 
calculate the amount by which the self-reported value exceeds market 
value — here, $50,000.  Next, we calculate the ratio at which 
government-assessed value is discounted relative to market value — 
here, the assessed value is 80% of the market value.  Finally, the 
owner premium is discounted by the same amount, in order to arrive 
at the taxable surplus — here, 80% x $50,000 = $40,000.  Thus, under 
 
119 Our model is the check-off box for presidential election financing on federal tax 
forms. 
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the second option, the taxpayer would pay a total property tax bill of 
$2,400.  The first $2,000 represents 1% of the government-assessed 
value of $200,000 and must be paid to the government.  The other 
$400 represents 1% of the taxable surplus of $40,000, and must be 
paid to a charity of the owner’s choice. 
Importantly, the market price used here for calculating the 
discount is not the market price of the specific property.  Rather, the 
discount is calculated by comparing market prices (determined by 
sales of similar sized properties) to assessed values throughout the 
neighborhood.  Thus, there is no need to engage in complicated 
assessments of market price of any individual property.  Instead, 
readily available data can be converted into an average ratio, 
providing the base for determining the tax discount. 
To illustrate how the two restrictions operate, we return to the 
example of the Introduction, modifying the numbers to accord with 
the previous example.  The city of Chicago has declared its desire to 
use its power of eminent domain to seize realty owned by Joni Olin 
for the purpose of building a public university.  The Cook County 
Assessor’s office has assessed the value of Blackacre at $200,000 for 
the purpose of property tax rolls, and the actual market value of the 
property is $250,000.  Ms. Olin values Blackacre at $300,000, and she 
so reports.  If the city takes the property, it will have to pay Ms. Olin 
the full $300,000.  If not, Ms. Olin will retain the property subject to 
the inalienability and property tax restraints.  She will only be able to 
sell Blackacre for less than $300,000 if she pays the City of Chicago 
the difference between this amount and the eventual sale price.  
Second, Ms. Olin will receive a tax bill adjusted for her self-assessed 
value of $300,000 rather than the former tax roll assessment of 
$200,000.  Ms. Olin’s taxable property value will be $240,000, and 
five-sixths of her tax bill will be paid to the municipality, and the 
other sixth to Ms. Olin’s charity of choice – naturally, the Federalist 
Society. 
If Ms. Olin sells Blackacre to Frieda Ford for $210,000 two years 
later, Ms. Olin will have to pay $90,000 to the city of Chicago as a 
redemption fee.  This transfer will end both the inalienability and tax 
restraints. 
Both the inalienability and tax restraints will require adjustments 
in order to remain viable over the course of time.  They must be 
updated yearly for the effects of inflation and fluctuations in the real 
estate market.  We suggest that this could best be accomplished by 
looking to a local housing price index. 
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Finally, we should note that while our proposal has been based 
upon a traditional exercise of eminent domain over land, it can be 
used in other contexts as well.  Self-assessment may be used, for 
example, for determining compensation for state actions deemed 
regulatory takings.  Specifically, where an owner successfully 
challenges a government action under an inverse taking suit, the court 
can consider ordering a self-assessment for determining the amount of 
compensation to be paid in the event that the government elects to 
carry out the deemed regulatory taking.  The self-assessment would 
be subject to all the rules outlined here in order to ensure its accuracy 
as a basis for compensation.  Unfortunately, however, it is not 
possible to extend our self-assessment proposal to takings of personal 
property unless the property is subject to periodic taxes based upon 
the property’s value. 
B. Assessing Self-Assessment 
Our proposed mechanism represents an improvement over 
existing takings compensation doctrine in two important ways.  First, 
it ensures the payment of full compensation to condemnees, and 
hence brings compensation practice into closer alignment with the 
demands of efficiency and fairness.  Second, it represents a reduction 
in transaction costs relative to the existing regime.  The current 
regime relies on expensive judicial determination of compensation 
awards when private negotiations break down.  We submit that the 
administrative process entailed in self-reporting will often arrive at a 
compensation figure at a lower cost than litigation.    
In this Section, we will discuss the incentive structure created by 
our proposal and delineate its limitations. It is important to note at the 
outset that while our model does not yield a first best result—
compensation at precisely the owner’s reserve price120—it brings us 
much closer to accurate compensation at a reasonable administrative 
cost.121  Due to the lack of a mechanism that precisely matches the 
penalties on over-reporting with its rewards, it is very difficult to 
design a legal apparatus that eliminates altogether 
undercompensation, on the one hand, and the blocking of efficient 
takings, on the other.  
 
120 This is a first best result if not inclusive of excessive development.  See supra 
Part I.B. 
121 Cf. Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of 
Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1997) (arguing that 
first-best results can be reached only by paying compensation equal to the value of 
the property to the taking authority). 
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To understand the incentive structure generated by our proposal, 
it is helpful to start with a simpler scenario: takings compensation on 
the basis of self-reported values without penalties.  In this case, the 
possibility of an inefficient taking is eliminated, because the owner 
has no reason to report a value of less than her reserve price.  Rather, 
the property owner’s self-report will be based on her best estimation 
of the value of her lot to the government, so long as it is greater than 
the reserve price.122  Because claiming too much runs the risk of 
forgoing a profit, owners will likely report an amount lower than their 
actual estimation of the value of the lot for the government.   
In the case of land assembly, matters become more complicated.  
Here, owners will have to take account of two additional factors: the 
value of the entire project to the government, and the likely behavior 
of other owners.  In order to extract the marginal value of the property 
to the government, owners will base their self-reporting on the total 
surplus of the project to the government, adjusted to the likely reports 
of other owners. In other words, property owners will attempt to 
maximize their personal payoff subject to the limitation that all 
reports must not exceed the total value of the project to the 
government.123  This process is prone to errors and has no stable 
equilibrium solution, leading to the well-known holdout problem that 
justifies eminent domain.124 
The real barrier to efficient outcomes in such a self-reporting 
scheme is that the parties may make mistakes on account of 
information and incentive constraints.  While the self-report 
eliminates the possibility that the government will seize a property 
whose reserve price exceeds the true value to the government, the 
owner may falsely report a reserve price that exceeds the estimated 
value to the government.  Thus, self-reporting without penalties 
ensures that no inefficient takings will proceed; however, it does not 
guarantee that efficient takings will go forward. 
Our proposal addresses this problems by, on the one hand, tying 
compensation to the reserve price of the owner (at least, as reported 
by the owner), and, on the other hand, penalizing the owner for over-
reporting.  The result is that the barrier to efficient takings is greatly 
 
122 While this might have undesirable distributive effects, it will lead to the optimal 
number of takings.  See, id. 
123 This is due to the fact that if the total self-reported amount exceed the 
government’s expected value, the government will forgo the project. 
124 See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (5th ed. 
1998) (justifying eminent domain as a mechanism for overcoming holdouts); 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124 (2004) 
(same). 
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reduced, while the chance of inefficient takings is lowered 
significantly.   
To begin with, we consider the effect of our proposed penalties 
on over-reporting values.  How does the addition of our two restraints 
change the reporting incentives of the owners?  Self-reporting 
potentially imposes two additional costs—a higher tax burden, and a 
partial inalienability restraint which makes property less liquid.  The 
inalienability restraint will never induce owners to report a price 
lower than their reserve price, for reasons we will explain shortly.  
However, it will not completely eliminate the possibility that owners 
will report a price greater than reserve price (and, accidentally, in 
excess of government value) and thereby block efficient takings.  The 
tax restraint produces a blanket incentive to report smaller values.  
Notably, this effect on incentives applies even if the reported price is 
lower than the reserve price.  At any reported value greater than the 
market price, even where less than the reserve price, the owner will 
face a higher property tax bill.  However, the discounting of the 
surplus tax significantly reduces the power of this incentive.  The 
result, we submit, is that owners will be driven to reporting values 
close to their reserve prices. 
We now turn to a more precise examination of the incentive 
structure created by our proposed penalties.  As we have seen, in the 
absence of penalties, all reporting is strategic, and is designed to 
capture as much of the government surplus as possible.  However, the 
inalienability restraint places a cost on excess reporting by reducing 
the ability of the owner to enjoy the full subjective value.  
Specifically, owners will not be able to translate the subjective value 
into other assets, unless they sell the property at the reported price.  
For any lower price, owners will lose part of the value they attach to 
their property.  The inalienability restraint is not important at reported 
prices lower than the reserve price.  After all, owners would not sell 
their property for less than the reserve price in any event.   
The inalienability restraint, on its own, does not provide a 
sufficient check on owner’s predisposition to over-report.  First, it is 
important to realize that not all owners wish to transfer title to their 
property in the foreseeable future.  Owners derive value from their 
properties in ways other than transfer, for example, through self-use 
or leasing.  Moreover, many owners have no realistic expectation of 
receiving an offer that would exceed their reserve price and 
consequently have no expectation of parting with their property.  Such 
owners derive value from their property through possession and use.  
Second, even for owners who consider transfer, the partial 
inalienability restraint does not impose a penalty on exaggeration 
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commensurate with the benefit.  The benchmark for the gain from 
exaggeration is still the value the government places on the project, 
whereas the cost is represented by the expected loss in the case of a 
future sale.  Since the two measures—the government value and the 
future sale price—bear no necessary relationship to one another, there 
will be cases where owners will expect to gain much more from 
exaggerated self-reports than they will lose.  
The tax restraint depresses the incentive to self-report prices 
above market price, and thereby further reduces the incentive to 
exaggerate.  Because the tax burden is discounted, the tax restraint 
only takes effect when self-reported values are higher than market 
price.  For any increment above market price, the owner should 
expect to pay the penalty of increased taxes if the government forgoes 
carries out the taking.  Because the tax liability is affected not only by 
the above-market premium reported, but also by the probability of 
taking, owners will be particularly careful not to exceed the 
government’s expected value.  Naturally, however, owners are 
unlikely to have very good information about the likelihood of taking 
and the government’s value. 
Unfortunately, the tax restraint does not bear any direct 
relationship to the owner’s reserve price.  For a self-reported price 
above reserve price, an owner will have to compare the expected 
gains of taking compensation above reserve (discounted by the 
possibility that a taking will not take place) with the expected cost of 
a tax liability for above-market value (discounted by the possibility 
that a taking will take place).  For a self-reported price below reserve, 
the owner will have to compare two kinds of costs: the expected cost 
of subjective value not covered by taking compensation (discounted 
by the possibility that a taking will not take place) and the expected 
cost of a tax liability for above-market value (discounted by the 
possibility that a taking will take place).  In either case, the owner’s 
reported value will be based upon estimations of government value 
and the likelihood of taking, rather than reserve price. 
Nevertheless, the tax restraint does leave room for reporting 
values above market price (allowing recapture of some subjective 
value).  And because its effects are discounted, it does not create 
excessive pressure to report low values.   
Together, the inalienability and tax restraints create an imperfect 
but definite incentive to report values close to the reserve price.  
There is no incentive whatsoever to report values lower than the 
market price.  For supra-market, sub-reserve prices, only the tax 
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restraint is important.  Finally, for supra-reserve prices, both the tax 
and inalienability restraints play a role in curbing exaggerations.  
Our analysis is summarized in the following table: 
 
Table I: Efficiency of Eminent Domain Under Different 
Compensation Regimes 
 Current Policy Self-
Reporting 
without 
Penalty 
Self-Reporting 
with Penalties 
Type I: 
Inefficient 
Project 
Implemented 
If reserve price > 
government value 
> market price  
Will not 
happen 
If reserve price > 
government value > 
reported price 
(RARE – depends 
on gap between 
reserve price and 
assessed price, 
property tax rates) 
Type II: 
Efficient 
Project Not 
Implemented 
Only if court 
exaggerates 
compensation 
value or high 
administrative 
costs 
If reported 
price > 
government 
value > 
reserve price 
If reported price > 
government value > 
reserve price 
(RARE – depends 
on owner 
information 
concerning 
government price) 
 
Per our earlier discussion, eminent domain may give rise to two 
types of inefficiencies. First, when owners are undercompensated, 
exercises of eminent domain may lead to the implementation of 
inefficient projects.  We refer to this possibility as Type I inefficiency. 
Second, when owners are overcompensated, the need to pay excess 
compensation may lead the government to cancel efficient 
development project.  We refer to this problem at Type II 
inefficiency.  
Because current compensation regime does not compensate 
owners for the full value they attach to their properties, it may 
generate a relatively high number of Type I inefficiencies.  In 
addition, the current compensation regime may also generate Type II 
inefficiencies—i.e., prevent efficient projects from moving forward—
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where, due to judicial error about market value, courts require 
compensation about the reserve price of condemnees 
(overcompensation) or where the administrative cost of meting out 
compensation is prohibitively high.  
Self-reporting without penalties eliminates the problem of Type I 
inefficiencies.  Under this regime, owners get to set their own price 
and will naturally refuse to sell for less than the value they place on 
their property.  However, self-reporting without penalties may lead to 
a high number of incidents of Type II inefficiencies.  Owners may 
exaggerate in their estimation of the government value, and block 
execution of the project altogether. 
Self-reporting with penalties reintroduces a small number of Type 
I inefficiencies, while dramatically reducing Type II inefficiencies.  
Because the potential increase in property tax liability due to the gap 
between reported value and government assessed value is relatively 
low, owners will rarely report a value under their reserve price, and 
thereby risk loss of a portion of subjective value.  Conversely, owners 
will rarely overshoot government value, since the price of 
exaggerated reports of property value includes an alienability 
restriction as well as greater tax liabilities. 
Finally, we should note the importance of the diversion of surplus 
tax revenues to a charity of the owner’s choice, rather than the 
government itself.  The introduction of heightened tax liability might 
spur the government to abuse its eminent domain power to boost the 
tax base.  If the government were to collect the full tax amount paid 
by owners, it would have an incentive to declare eminent domain 
projects, without really intending to execute them, in order to extract 
higher property taxes from all the supposedly affected owners. To 
safeguard against such strategic abuse by the government, we propose 
that the incremental rise in tax revenues be diverted to another source. 
C. The Self-Assessment Literature 
Recently, scholarly interest in self-assessment has grown;125 our 
proposal is consistent with this trend.  The legal literature on self-
assessment may be traced back to Levmore’s seminal piece on 
property taxes,126 which we have already discussed at some length127 
and will continue to analyze here.  Inspired by Levmore, in a previous 
 
125 See, e.g., Fennel, supra note 9; Levmore, supra note 24, Bell & Parchomovsky, 
Takings Reassessed, supra note 25.  
126 Levmore, supra note 24. 
127 See, supra Part II.A.  
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essay, we proposed a self-assessment mechanism to account for the 
effect of derivative takings — government acts that do not amount to 
physical or regulatory takings on property values.128  Most recently, 
Lee Anne Fennell made an important contribution to the self-
assessment literature by proposing self-assessment mechanisms for 
establishing the value of environmental and zoning amenities.129  To 
date, eminent domain compensation has eluded systematic analysis in 
the self-assessment framework, and while Levmore’s article briefly 
looks at eminent domain, he arrives at it from a different direction, 
treating the matter as an extension of a basic tax-oriented theory.130  
Indeed, in her article, Lee Anne Fennell lists eminent domain as an 
example of a paradigmatic self-assessment case that has not yet been 
resolved.131 
What is the draw of self-assessment and why is it growing?  
Disclosure of information through the legal system may often be 
costly and the outcome of the process may be highly inaccurate.132  
This is especially true in cases where one of the parties is in 
possession of nonobservable and nonverifiable information from 
which she can derive great benefit.  Since judicial and administrative 
processes are both expensive and error-prone,133 the modern trend in 
legal scholarship is to look for private and quasi-private mechanisms 
for resolving certain kinds of market failures. 134  Thus, for example, 
 
128 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 25. 
129 Fennell, supra note 9. 
130 Levmore, supra note 24, at 789-90. 
131 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419-20 (using eminent domain as an example where 
“name your own award” and standard bargaining fail).. 
132 See e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1030 (1995) 
(pointing out that "self-interested bargainers have a strong incentive to misrepresent 
their private valuations so as to capture a larger share of the bargaining 'pie"'); 
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and 
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 281 
(2002) (discussing how parties' strategic incentives may impede a judge's ability to 
assess valuations accurately); Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 
J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 117 (1987) (explaining that private valuations typically induce 
actors to lie, "[u]nless everyone shares the same goals,").  
133 See e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability 
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 452 (1995) (arguing 
that it will be costly and difficult for courts to assess damages accurately precisely 
in those situations that private bargaining fails); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
713, 750-751 (1996) (contending that injunctions poses an even greater assessment 
challenge for courts).  
134 For an elaborate discussion of possible legal solutions to the problem of private 
information, see, AYRES, supra note 116. 
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Fennell focuses on the difficulties faced by courts in evaluating 
environmental and zoning amenities.135 
In the remainder of this subsection, we will highlight the 
differences between our self-assessment mechanism and other similar 
mechanisms, especially that of Levmore.  Both Levmore and Fennell 
focus on what Fennell dubbed “Entitlement Subject to Self-Made 
Options” (ESSMO).136  This options mechanism requires the 
entitlement holder to create a call or put option on her entitlement, 
and thereby subject herself to a forced sale at the predetermined strike 
price.137  For example, in discussing the problem of yard art in the 
context of common interest community, Fennell suggested that each 
unit owner who displays art works in her yard would be required to 
set a price at which the community could remove the art work from 
the yard.138  In the same vein, to introduce flexibility into 
conservation easements arrangements, Fennell suggested that the 
easement holder (the government or a qualifying non governmental 
organization) would set a “running call option” on the easement, 
allowing future owners of the relevant tract to “reclaim” the 
easement.139  Likewise, Levmore’s proposed a property tax system 
that would require owners to self-assess the value of their properties 
while allowing others to acquire the property at the reported 
valuation.140 
Both Fennel’s and Levmore’s projects are far more ambitious 
than ours; both seek not a solution to the local problem of inadequate 
compensation, but, rather, to change the very nature of entitlements in 
our legal system.  They seek to impose on all entitlement holders the 
duty to create new options exercisable by third parties.141  We limit 
our suggestions to the realm of eminent domain.  Thus, we seek to 
intervene in a case where the government already has a call option on 
all property exercisable at the government’s will as long as the 
exercise is for a public use.  For this reason, we anticipate that our 
 
135 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1444-87. 
136 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1406. 
137 Id., at 1407-08. 
138 Id., at 1446-50. 
139 Id., at 1446-50. 
140 Levmore, supra note 24, at 779 (“[i]n short, the system uses forced sales, in lieu 
of audits and fines, as a way of encouraging accurate self-assessment “). 
141 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1407 (“[an ESSMO] works by requiring a party to 
package her true subjective valuation in the form of an option—in other words, she 
must formulate a ‘revealing option.’”); Levmore, supra note 24, at 779 (requiring 
property owner to state a price at which third parties may force them to sell their 
properties). 
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proposal may be adopted even by those opposed to revolutionary 
change in the legal approach to entitlements. 
A second difference is that Fennel and Levmore seek to achieve 
accurate self-assessment by blurring the roles of buyer and seller.  
Their mechanisms attempt to put the entitlement holder in a position 
where she does not know whether she is buying or selling the relevant 
entitlement.142  The better the mechanism “veils” the role of the 
entitlement holder, the more effective it is in inducing truthful 
reporting.  Moreover, both Fennel and Levmore assign the function of 
securing honest self-reporting by entitlement owners to the market or 
a segment thereof.  The sanction both scholars employ to deter 
inaccurate reporting is forced acquisitions by private actors.143 
Eminent domain is not amenable to a similar mechanism.  In the 
context of eminent domain, the government is always the “buyer.”144 
Our legal system grants the government a call option over private 
property,145 and we do not seek to add to this a general put option in 
property owners that would empower them to sell their property to the 
government under normal circumstances.  Nor do we wish to expand 
the number of parties that may exercise a call option over the 
property.  Hence, we are forced to use a different mechanism design 
to induce truthful self-assessment.  Instead of using forced sales, we 
employ a partial inalienability and tax constraints to deter owners 
from exaggerating.   
Since Levmore noted that his mechanism may also be used in the 
takings context, we would like to further elaborate on the differences 
between his apparatus and ours.  First, because Levmore's main focus 
is self assessment of value for tax purposes,146 his scheme is designed 
primarily to overcome is under-evaluation.  We, by contrast, focus on 
eminent domain and hence the main challenge for us is over-
valuation.  Indeed, we specifically employ a decoupling mechanism 
intended to block use of self-assesment to raise property tax revenues.  
 
142 See e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 132, at 1030 (“[D]ivided entitlements can 
facilitate trade by inducing claim holders to reveal more information than they 
would under an undivided entitlement regime. Owners of divided, or ‘Solomonic’ 
entitlements must bargain more forthrightly than owners of undivided entitlements, 
because the entitlement division obscures the titular boundary between ‘buyer’ and 
‘seller.’”). 
143 Fennell, supra note 9, at 1407-09; Levmore, supra note 24, at 779-80. 
144 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 59-64 (2002) (discussing eminent domain). 
145 See AYRES, supra note 116, at 4.  Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 144. 
146 Levmore, supra note 24, at 778-791 (discussing self-assessment in the context of 
property tax). 
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Second, and relatedly, the scope of Levmore’s project and remedies is 
vastly different than ours.  Levmore would apply his self-assessment 
mechanism to all property owners, and would allow private takings 
(forced purchases by other private parties).147  Our mechanism 
requires self-assessments only from property owners whose property 
is subject to condemnation, and allows takings only by the 
government.  Third, and finally, because of our different goals, we use 
two mechanisms to keep property owners honest:  increased tax 
liability and partial inalienability.  Levmore uses a different 
mechanism altogether: the threat of forced purchases by third 
parties.148  Note that the real big difference here is that Levmore's goal 
is our means, and one of our means is his ultimate goal (increased tax 
revenues (at a lower cost, of course).  As a result, Levmore has 
neither need nor use for the partial inalienability. 
III. EXTENSIONS AND POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
In this Part, we elaborate on some of the implications of our self-
assessment proposal and address potential objections.  Specifically, 
we focus on the challenges posed by using inalienability and property 
tax valuations to induce accurate reporting in the context of eminent 
domain, and the cases in which self-assessed prices may prevent the 
government from realizing its plans.    
A. Corner Cases 
We begin by examining potential problems with our inalienability 
restraint.  As we noted, the restriction deters owners from 
overreporting their subjective value lest they be prevented from 
transferring the property at anything less than an exaggerated price.149  
We also noted that the effectiveness of this restraint would depend on 
the owners’ anticipation of a sale or other transfer during the coming 
seventy years.150  However, there are a number of cases in which the 
owner might have no realistic expectation of sale during her life, such 
as where the owner is elderly, rendering the inalienability restraint 
less effective.   
 
147 Id. 
148 Id., at 779 (“[p]eriodically--perhaps every other year in staggered fashion around 
a locale--the self-assessed amounts are publicized and any buyer who is willing to 
pay that amount to the owner/self-assessor is entitled to the property). 
149 See, supra Part II.A. 
150 See, supra Part II.A. 
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In many cases, elderly owners will expect to transfer title only 
upon their death, through bequest or inheritance.  While the partial 
inalienability restraint will apply to the property in the hands of the 
heirs or devisees, elderly owners may discount the effects of this 
restraint as it does not apply directly to them.  The result is that the 
value of the expected sanction imposed by the inalienability restraint 
will be lower.  Hence, such owners may have a greater motivation to 
overstate their self-assessment price. 
While we recognize that elderly owners pose a challenge for our 
scheme, this challenge should not be overstated.  First, the difference 
between elderly owners and other owners is merely a difference in 
degree, not in kind.  Hence, our scheme should also work in the case 
of elderly owners.  It must be borne in mind that the property tax 
restraint will apply to elderly owners who fail to sell at their self-
assessed price. The increased tax liability will naturally curb the 
incentive of elderly owners to overstate the value they attach to their 
properties.  
Second, while folk wisdom suggests that elderly owners are 
likely to hold out against efficient development, this perception may 
be more of a myth than reality.  On average, the cost of eminent 
domain for elderly owners is higher than it is for other owners.  This 
is because the cost of transition is especially high for elderly owners, 
meaning the elderly owners likely face higher transaction costs in 
replacing property.  Consequently, compensation at market value, as 
is the case under current doctrine, disproportionately 
undercompensates elderly owners, leaving elderly owners with a 
higher incentive for opposing all projects requiring them to surrender 
property for market price. 
Our proposal, by contrast, guarantees elderly owners full 
compensation at their subjective value in the event of a taking.   In 
other words, our mechanism alleviates the special plight of elderly 
owners, and eliminates their motivation to hold out.  Hence, it is 
impossible to predict the behavior of elderly owners under our 
proposal based on their actions under the existing system. 
A different type of owners that seem to pose a challenge for our 
proposal is corporate owners.  Corporate owners do not attach 
emotional value to their properties and thus, one might argue that 
corporations should be compensated at market value when their 
properties are taken.  This argument misses the mark.  While it may 
be true that corporations have no sentiments, this does not mean that 
corporations realize only market value from the property they own.  
Indeed, the large amounts of goodwill found in corporate balance 
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sheets demonstrate that corporations often enjoy value beyond the 
market value of their assets.  It is possible that a corporation’s 
goodwill grows out of its business operations, not from the unique 
value it derives from its assets, in which case the taking of an asset 
will not diminish the corporation’s goodwill.  Yet, even if 
corporations derive only market value from their assets, this would 
not undermine our self-assessment scheme.  Given the incentive 
structure of our self-assessment proposal, we predict that our scheme 
would reduce litigation and administrative costs, making it a superior 
way of carrying out takings compensation even at market value. 
B. What’s Left of Eminent Domain 
A broader objection would claim that our proposal essentially 
eliminates eminent domain.  The essence of eminent domain is the 
ability to force an owner to part with title of an asset, substituting the 
owner’s property rule protection for a liability rule protection.151  We 
openly admit that our proposal transforms the nature of eminent 
domain, restoring in the owner many of the traditional benefits of 
property rule protection.  Does this change do away with all the 
benefits of eminent domain? The power of eminent domain is 
necessary to enable the state to provide public goods.  Standard 
economic theory maintains that without eminent domain, the state 
will not be able to procure the assets necessary for the provision of 
public goods on account of information asymmetries and strategic 
holdouts.152  Eminent domain allows the government to sidestep these 
strategic difficulties by temporarily altering the nature of the owner’s 
protection to that of a liability rule, thereby empowering the state to 
force a sale.153 
Although we do away with the power of the state to force a sale 
at market price, we do not divest the state of its coercive powers.  
While the state can no longer force a sale at market value, owners 
only have the ability to name their own price, not to issue a blanket 
refusal to sell.  Moreover, the introduction of the tax and inalienability 
restraints provides owners with a powerful incentive to report 
accurately the subjective value they attach to their property.  Granted, 
the power we give to owners to set the price of their properties may in 
some cases result in a government decision to forego a taking at the 
self-assessed price.  But this should only worry us if the self-assessed 
 
151 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra, note 144; Fennell, supra note 9; Merrill, supra 
note 1. 
152 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 124, at 62. 
153 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 144. 
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price is exaggerated.  So long as the self-assessed price reflects the 
subjective value to the owner, we do not want the state to take the 
property unless its value exceeds the self-assessed price; otherwise, 
the planned taking is inefficient.   
We acknowledge that ours is not a first-best solution.  
Consequently, under our proposal, owners will, in some cases, 
exaggerate in their self-assessments.  Depending on the magnitude of 
the exaggeration and the government surplus, exaggerated reports 
may in some cases thwart efficient development projects.  While the 
inalienability and tax restraints should reduce the magnitude of this 
efficiency loss, they will not eliminate it completely.  However, this 
inefficiency does not signal the failure of our proposal.  Current 
compensation doctrine is also susceptible to efficiency losses such as 
where courts set compensation too low, and the government proceeds 
with inefficient projects.  While we lack empirical data to demonstrate 
the relative sizes of these inefficiencies, we suspect that efficiency 
losses are greater under the current system than they would be under 
our proposed alternative. 
A case of particular concern for us is that of irrational owners of 
unique assets.  While an irrational owner is of little importance when 
the asset at issue has ready substitutes and is traded in a functioning 
market, the irrational owner of a unique good without substitutes 
presents a nettlesome problem.  In such cases, the irrational owner 
may as well name a price that is outrageously high, placing an 
inefficient (and irrational) block on a worthy project.  This concern 
may be especially acute in times of national emergency. 
To alleviate this concern, an additional safety valve may be added 
to our proposal.  In instances of declared national emergency, the 
government could be granted the power to petition a court to override 
the self-assessed valuation and substitute a court determination of the 
owner’s subjective value.  For example, this special procedure may be 
invoked in war time in order to seize a precious mineral necessary for 
the production of weaponry after the owner dramatically over-
assessed the price of the asset.   
This procedure may also be employed in other cases involving 
irrational owners, such as holdouts in large land assembly cases.  For 
example, in land assembly cases involving more than twenty parcels, 
the government could be permitted to seek a court assessment of the 
value of holdout parcels if the government obtains 95% of the 
targeted parcels through voluntary sales or by compensation at the 
self-assessed price. 
SSRN WORKING PAPER © 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky 9/16/2005  2:09 PM 
 BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION 46 
C. The Mismatch Between Takings Compensation and Property 
Tax Assessments 
As we noted earlier the main barrier for achieving first best 
solution (precise assessment at the subjective value) is the lack of 
functionally opposite counterpart to takings compensation.  A truly 
accurate self-assessment requires that the reported price would serve 
as both a buying and a selling price.154   For takings, the self-assessed 
value serves only as a benchmark for the owner’s selling price.  While 
property tax assessments take the place of a buying price in our 
proposal, the match is imperfect.  As we noted, property tax 
assessments are not based upon a property’s “true” value, or even its 
market value.  Rather, property tax assessments are determined 
through a complex formula that incorporates elements such as last 
sale price, historic value and location.155  Only rarely do tax appraisals 
approximate the true value for the owner. 
The mismatch between the two opens up the possibility of 
strategic misuse of our mechanism by the government.  Our proposal 
enhances the ability of the government to collect property taxes, by 
changing the property tax base from the traditional assessment 
formulation to traditional assessment plus some percentage of 
subjective value.  We combat the government’s incentive to misuse 
takings declarations by diverting the additional increment of property 
taxes to a charitable organization of the owner’s choice.  While doing 
this dramatically reduces the government’s ability to abuse our 
mechanism, it does not completely eliminate the potential for abuse.  
The government may declare its intent to take properties simply in 
order to raise revenues to charitable organizations.  
While the concern about strategic misuse of takings declarations 
is a real one, we do not believe it is a crucial one.  We entrust the 
choice of charities to the affected owner.  Given the wide range of 
charities, it is hard to see how the government can use our mechanism 
to target donations to charities on an ideological basis.  Since the 
government has no way of knowing how the additional property taxes 
will affect optional charitable giving, it cannot even know if, as a 
whole, charities will enjoy greater donations.  Even if the government 
could be certain of greater charitable revenues, the activities of 
charities are so diverse that the government could not reliably plan on 
reducing any line-item in the budget.  Hence, it is quite far-fetched to 
 
154 See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1432 (“uncertainty over whether one will end up 
buying or selling fungible portions of an entitlement helps to keep valuations of that 
entitlement honest”). 
155 See, supra Part II.A. 
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believe that the government would rely on our mechanism as a means 
for funding charitable activities.  
CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain is one of the most extreme weapons in the 
government’s arsenal of powers that affect private citizenry.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that eminent domain has been at the 
center of many heated debates in the legal academy and outside of 
it.156  Dissatisfaction with compensation practices has even led, of 
late, legal scholars and economists to question the need for this 
controversial power.  For example, in explaining why he believes 
eminent domain to be undesirable in this day and age,157 Nobel 
 
156 Daniel Farber issued one of the milder summaries of the state of takings law: 
“there is no consensus today about takings law--only a general belief that the 
takings problem is difficult and that takings doctrine is a mess.” Daniel Farber, 
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279 (1992). Jed 
Rubinfeld was less charitable, opining that “[t]hroughout constitutional 
jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for 
the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize.” Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 
102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993). There is no shortage of critics of the 
jurisprudence of takings. See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: 
Has the Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent 
Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 302, 308 (1998) (“The incoherence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court's output in this field has by now been demonstrated time and 
again by practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add 
to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this 
frustrating and increasingly pointless enterprise.”). 
157 Becker believes that through time the costs of the eminent domain power have 
eclipsed the benefits: 
  In the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, governments did rather little, so 
there was not much to fear from great abuse of the eminent domain 
constitutional clause. In fact, the first real eminent domain case was not 
decided until 1876. Now, however, government at all levels do so much 
that the temptation is irresistible to use eminent domain condemnation 
proceedings to hasten and cheapen their accumulation of property for 
various projects, regardless of a projects merits.  
  … [U]sually a road can take competing paths, a power plant can be built in 
different locations, and so forth, so that buyers, government or private, can 
use the leverage from competition among sites to reduce the advantage of 
holding out.  And sometimes they can build around stubborn holdouts, as 
happened when the property to build the privately accumulated Rockefeller 
Center was put together…  I am not claiming that a system without eminent 
domain would work perfectly—it would not.  But modern governments 
have more than enough power through the power to tax and regulate. 
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laureate Gary Becker wrote, “[t]o me, the only reasonable 
interpretation of "fair compensation" is the worth of property to the 
present owners.158 
Becker is not alone.  There is little doubt that the current 
compensation practice, which many perceive as neither fair nor 
efficient is major contributor to the general dissatisfaction with 
eminent domain and the calls for its abolition.  It is quite likely, 
therefore, that if property owners received full compensation for the 
loss occasioned on them by eminent domain exercises, the public 
sentiment toward eminent domain would have been more favorable. 
In this Article, we developed a mechanism that allows 
policymakers to achieve this goal.  Our self-assessment proposal, by 
allowing property owners to name their compensation award, yields a 
fairer and more efficient eminent domain regime.  Even the sharpest 
opponents of eminent domain recognize that “[e]liminating the 
eminent domain clause from the Constitution is obviously not feasible 
in any foreseeable time frame.”159  In light of this fact, it becomes all 
the more important to ensure that affected property owners receive 
full compensation for their losses. 
Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, On Eminent Domain, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/06/index.html (June 27, 2005, 
7:35 EDT). 
158 Id. (emphasis added). 
159 Id. 
